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Abstract 
Industrialisation in South Africa followed the resource determined forward and backward linkages in Rostowian 
fashion. From the nineteenth century agro-industries established the initial foundation of Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurial changes to agrarian life. The transition into industrialisation occurred within the Polanyian state 
intervention in the market to drive industrial development. The context of the mineral- agrarian economy 
determined state mitigation of the high cost structure of the economy. Geographical location, factors of production 
(labour, capital) and policy directives determined a market intervention. Import-substitution as strategic policy 
option as proposed by Prebisch, was followed, but the state refrained from full socialism or central market 
planning. The industrialisation of the South African economy gained momentum since the 1920 under 
protectionist state industrial policies. Powerful business groups, corporate entrepreneurs, especially from the 
mining sector, collaborated with state protectionism. The Gerschenkronian latecomer effect indeed played itself 
out in South African industrialisation, but local human capital developed innovative technology locally to enhance 
the industrialisation process. The trajectory of South African industrialisation reflects the establishment of a near 
first-world industrial base, grounded in a mix of scare factors of production (capital, entrepreneurship, skilled 
labour) and abundant factors of production (unskilled labour, natural resources). Weberian traits of the Protestant 
work ethic is a significant driver of economic, and specifically industrial development in South Africa. The 
specific context of a European minority population controlling the political economy, eventually impacted 
negatively on the modernisation and progress of the industrial sector in South Africa by the end of the twentieth 
century. 
Introduction. 
Africa is not considered an industrialised continent. Recently the ‘dismal growth performance 
of the African continent’ was considered to have produced the ‘worst economic disaster of the 
twentieth century’ (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Easterley and Levine, 1997; Collier and 
Gunning,1999). Considering South Africa’s industrialisation trajectory, allows an 
understanding of the outcome of state-market interventionist strategies to facilitate the 
development of an industrial sector during the twentieth century. The economic development 
of South Africa has followed a different trajectory. As a divided political entity before 1910, 
the constitutional unification in 1910 had direct consequences for the development path of the 
economy. As colonial economies of the British Empire, the agro-commercial economies of the 
Cape Colony and the Natal Colony, were primary economies based on agriculture and 
merchants trade through ports connecting the colonies to British trade networks. The 
agricultural activity in the Cape Colony delivered wheat, wine and fruit farming, resulting in 
territorial expansion allowing wool (sheep) and  cattle farming to contribute to the livelihood 
of the settler and indigenous population. The mining of natural resources was limited to some 
copper, diamond and iron ore mining before the last quarter of the twentieth century. In the 
Natal Colony the indigenous Zulu people farmed with cattle, while the settler population 
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introduced the farming of cotton, sugar cane and maize. The discovery of coal deposits in the 
northern parts of the colony added to limited diversification into mining, but by the turn of the 
century the wealth of the Natal Colony lay in its geographical location on the east coast of the 
southern part of Africa.  Trade through the port of Natal contributed significantly to the colonial 
economy. In the interior two Boer Republics were primarily agricultural oriented, with the 
export of wool through the Port Natal harbour constituted a significant portion of state revenue 
of the Republic of the Orange Free State. The South African Republic was a poor agricultural 
economy, producing primarily for subsistence, both by the European settlers and the 
indigenous African population. Economic activity in the four territories that would become the 
Union of South Africa in 1910, was primarily extractive – primary production and mining. The 
most progressive farmers were English-speaking settlers in the Eastern Cape and Northern 
Natal, while fruit and wine farming by the descendants of the Dutch colony in the Western 
Cape, developed capacity for agricultural diversification. By the last half of the nineteenth 
century the mineral discoveries (diamonds and gold) attracted international attention to the new 
growth possibilities of the region, causing extensive geo-political conflict and devastation of 
economic resources. The so-called mineral ‘revolution’ of the late 1870s and 1880s created the 
demand for basic manufactured goods. Secondary industries were elementary and served the 
needs of the mining sector by 1910. The rational economic strategy called for market 
consolidation, allowing agreements on the movement of factors of production, unrestricted 
transport to and from the mines and ports to stimulate trade. In 1910 the constitutional path 
was prepared for the development of the South African economy. (Jones and Müller, 1990; 
Coleman, 1982; Houghton, 1978).  
Constitutional union and state policy. 
The economic system of the four territories prior to unification was primarily capitalist, but 
with weakly developed markets and co-existence with a non-market traditional communal 
system of production. A diversity of indigenous peoples, both hunter-gathers and pastoralists 
outnumbered the small European population. Two relatively distinct European settler entities 
developed in South Africa at a time of numerical domination by the indigenous population. A 
conglomeration of Western European settlers from the Netherlands, Germany and France 
formed a community of ‘Afrikaners’, desirous of socio-political independence and definitely 
non-submission to the British imperial authority. British settlers sustained commercial links to 
the country of origin, developing networks of financial and commercial exchange. The 
Afrikaner people were primarily farmers, and apart from the Western Cape wheat and wine 
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farmers, and the small sheep farming community of the Orange Free State, subsistence 
oriented. The prerequisites for the development of a modern industrialised economy were 
political stability, population management, security of socio-economic institutions of property 
rights, individual freedom and security of contract, market decentralisation to encourage 
individualism, entrepreneurship and grasping the opportunities of markets. The nascent market 
economy of South Africa by 1910 stood at the brink of industrial development. This depended 
on the Rostowian transformation of primary production into mechanised production, access to 
capital (sufficient domestic savings and investment) and a productive labour force. The ‘take-
off’ was slow to occur, because of an absence of central market forces towards a shared 
economic goal. 
At this point in the development of the local economy, only very limited manufacturing 
occurred. The primary source of foreign exchange was the export of primary products, gold, 
diamonds, hides and skins. These exports were not, as had been argued by Bairoch, the 
prerequisite for British industrialisation. The industrial revolution has already occurred more 
than a century ago, and local coal, or other minerals, went to Britain, as well as markets in 
Europe. The export of South African primary products sustained relative easy access for the 
domestic economy, to essential imports of consumer goods and vital inputs for the small local 
manufacturing industry. In the next decades this direction of advantage was strengthened. 
Socio-political divisions between Afrikaans nationalist anti-British people and the English-
speaking British loyalists, who also controlled the commanding heights of the economy 
(mining, finance, commerce), and the majority of the population who stood outside political 
decision-making, undermined a shared economic vision. Moving towards political consensus 
was slow, but by the early 1920s sufficient political stability delivered state policies towards 
the protection of local industry, and gradual support for commercial farming and 
mechanisation. The population of 5.9 million people in 1910 rose to 9 million by the mid-
1930s. The white population comprised only around 21 % of the total population, the African 
black population around 68% and the Indian and Coloured communities around 11%. Sectoral 
contribution to the national income by 1912 was as follows: agriculture 17 %, mining 27%, 
manufacturing 7% and commerce 13.5%. The structural change occurred slowly and by the 
1990s agriculture contributed less than 6% to gross domestic product, mining 12%, 
manufacturing 25%, commerce 13% and finance 13%.(SARB Quarterly Statistical Bulletins, 
1920-1990).  
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By the 1930s the South African economy was still a primary economy, dependent on mining 
and agriculture. Exports comprised of raw materials, such as wool, diamonds, gold, wheat, fruit 
and other foodstuffs, hides and skins. Imports of secondary goods originated from the 
industrialised countries of Britain and Europe. By the late 1930s gold export still comprised 
67% of total South African exports. (Schumann, 1938:100-103; Jones and Müller, 1992:114-
15). The structural change did not follow from Rostowian mechanisation in agriculture, nor the 
supply of capital by the agricultural sector to finance manufacturing. The take-off occurred 
from a conscious nationalistic motivated inward-looking industrial development policy. The 
take-off was funded by mineral exports. Bestowed with the political power in the Union, the 
South African Parliament, systematically introduced protectionist policies towards local 
industries since 1914 in the form of protective customs duties. The participation of South Africa 
on the side of the Allied Powers in the First World War (1914-1919) stimulated local 
manufacturing production. After the war, industrialists and Afrikaner nationalist interests 
converged in systematically expanding state protection of local industries. The agency of the 
white population, representing foreign capital, local emerging nationalist capital, championed 
for the establishment of a Board of Trade and Industry in 1921 (first a part-time institution and 
later a permanent state body). Industrial protection through customs duties was not enough to 
assist in nurturing infant industries. 
In the mining sector skilled workers, predominantly white, enjoyed the protection of the Mines 
and Works Act of 1911, reserving certain specific categories of work for white workers. The 
Chamber of Mines sought to deal with rising costs of deep-level mining by employing more 
African workers as opposed to better skilled white workers. White workers were protected by 
the Status Quo Agreement, negotiated between the white controlled Mine Worker’s Union, and 
the Chamber of Mines. The agreement provided for the employment of two white workers for 
every 17 black workers. By 1921 the Chamber of Mines decided to abandon the agreement, 
seeking to lower labour cost. A violent strike erupted in 1922, quelled by Union armed forces. 
Having defeated the militant white workers, the new labour dispensation weakened white 
labour and led to growing employment of a growing African workforce. The military defeat of 
the strike shifted support from the ruling South African Party to the National Party and the 
Labour Party. In 1924 the National Party won the general election with the Labour Party as 
alliance partner. The Pact Government implemented a ‘civilised labour policy’, which afforded 
the white labour force advantages in employment reservation, higher wages (‘civilised ‘ wages) 
and the right to organise themselves in trade unions. Through the Industrial Conciliation Act 
Verhoef 5 
 
of 1924 and the Wages Act of 1925 the skilled workforce was entrenched and the African 
workforce controlled in a structure of market distortion. (Feinstein, 2005: 82-89).  
The ability to manage the labour force supported inward-looking industrialisation. Since 1924 
industrialisation of the South African economy received extended institutional support. A 
permanent Board of Trade and Industry was appointed in 1924, and higher customs tariffs were 
introduced by the Customs Tariff Act, No 36 of 1925 to protect local industries. The global 
Depression of 1929 hit primary exporting South Africa adversely, but the dramatic collapse of 
agricultural and resources prices was exacerbated by the decision of the South African 
Government not to follow the British decision in 1930 to abandon the gold standard. While 
other Commonwealth countries, such as Australia followed Britain off the gold standard, South 
Africa defended the gold standard ‘to display its confidence in gold’. The cost to the domestic 
economy was high: the South African currency was placed at a premium, exports collapsed, 
imports from countries off the gold standards flooded local markets and outcompeted local 
manufacturing. The South African Government finally followed the rest of the British 
Commonwealth off the gold standard in December 1932. (Lumby, 1982a: 209-211). Immediate 
recovery of foreign trade and the rapid increase in the gold price injected growth opportunities 
into the market. 
State policies supported economic recovery. Product markets for land, labour capital in the 
African periphery remained inextricably linked to the industrial core of the British 
Commonwealth. Banks and other financial institutions, such as insurance companies, were 
predominantly incorporated in Britain. Local financial institutions entered the market for 
financial services, but only towards the late 1960s did the state mandate domestication of 
financial services institutions. Market recovery in the aftermath of the Depression, benefitted 
from nationalist state-directed inward-looking policies to secure the recovery of the mining 
sector, to stimulate industrial diversification and to promote exports.  
An important deviation from the Latin-American model of industrialisation, is the absence in 
South Africa of any form of centrally planned plan-linked industrial development. The state 
was indeed influenced by business interests. The state responded to advice from commissions 
of inquiry and the Board of Trade and Industry on protectionist policies and incentives to 
stimulate manufacturing. The state did intervene in financial markets by introducing 
domestication policies in the insurance and banking industry to ensure the availability of 
domestic savings for domestic industrial development. In this way domestic savings, as 
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suggested by Rostow, funded industrialisation. The Insurance Act of 1943 introduced rigid 
investment requirements compelling long-term insurance companies to invest in prescribed 
state bonds and public stock. South Africa was a net recipient of FDI until the late 1960s, but 
then international pressure against the policies of the state, gradually reversed this trend. South 
African banks and insurance companies, as well as private finance houses of industry (FVB in 
the case of Afrikaner industrial development) and the mining sector (such as JCI, the 
investment house of the AAC), were significant in investing local capital in local development. 
This was an important driver of the diversification of the South African economy.  
Two elements of industrial policy contributed to the strengthening of secondary industry. 
 The first aspect was more state intervention through State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). These 
included the establishment of the Electricity Supply Commission (ESCOM) in 1923; the Iron 
and Steel Corporation of South Africa (ISCOR) in 1922, the Industrial Development 
Corporation of South Africa (IDC) in 1942 and the South African Oil and Gas Corporation 
(SASOL) in 1951. Smaller SOEs were in phosphate development, atomic energy production, 
and much later armament development (ARMSCOR). The transport sector was always 
organised in the Department of Railways and Harbours (SAS&H) and water supply through 
provincial and municipal entities. The SOEs were organised either as state departments after 
unification in 1910, or as SOEs to support industrialisation policies. SASOL was privatised in 
1979, and ISCOR in 1987, parts of ARMSCOR and Telkom, the telecommunication fixed line 
supplier, after 1994, but transport, electricity and water remain SOEs. The state secured access 
to basic infrastructure, at subsidised prices, to the emerging industrial sector. The IDC 
contributed to minimise market risk, though advisory and management services to new 
enterprises and through the provision of seed capital. The state always invited private 
investment into SOEs, but control remained with the state, signifying the mutual co-existence 
between mining, industrial and financial capital on the one hand, and the state. (Jones and 
Müller, 1992: 171; Feinstein, 2005:124).  
A significant contribution to industrial development and industrial diversification was made by 
the Afrikaans-speaking people’s nationalism. This nationalism inspired the establishment of 
Afrikaner-controlled businesses – from newspaper and printing, insurance, banking, diversified 
manufacturing, mining, wine production and agricultural processing and transport. These 
nationalistic ambitions dovetailed with state industrial policies, but initially brought intense 
competition with English-speaking and foreign capital in the mining and industrial sectors. 
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(Verhoef, 2006; 2009; 2010; 2014; Lipton, 1986: 259-266; Feinstein, 2005: 176-180). The 
convergence of nationalist capitalist aspirations of the Afrikaner people and the business 
interests of foreign capital in miming, industry and finance, with a relatively stable labour force, 
delivered strong growth and diversification of secondary industry up to the late 1960s.  
The stimulus of the First World War gave a kick-start to local industries. The adverse effects 
of the Depression in 1929, and subsequent weakening of the primary sector, not solely because 
of the global collapse of primary products, but also the unilateral Government decision to defy 
international monetary trends, forced South Africa to acknowledge its integration into the 
world economy. Small manufacturing enterprises matured into larger corporations and needed 
access to international markets. Industrial protection assisted in the post-depression recovery, 
but it was primarily the Second World War demand and subsequent international recovery on 
the foundation of the Marshall Plan and European recovery, that supported South Africa’s 
industrial progress. By the early 1960s the manufacturing industry had expanded significantly. 
For the first time in the history of South Africa, manufacturing contributed more to GDP than 
the combined contribution of agriculture and mining to GDP. The expensive protectionism 
succeeded in growing industry. The number of manufacturing industry establishments rose 
from 3 638 in 1915/16 to 12 727 in 1966. The number of employees in industry rose from 
89 000 in 1915/16 to 941 848 in 1966; and the value of industrial output rose from R 71.3 
million in 1915/16 to R5 104 million in 1966. (Department of Statistics, 1920-1967) The cost 
of promoting secondary industries were high. Between 1915/16 and 1939 more than half (55%) 
of imported raw materials utilised in the manufacturing industry, were imported and only 
13.2% of the value of the imported raw materials were recovered by actual exports of 
manufactured final goods. In 1939 the value of imported raw materials for manufacturing was 
still 47.9% of the value of imported raw materials, but the value of exports from manufacturing 
only 6.4% of the value of imported raw materials for manufacturing (Lumby, 1982b:216, 227). 
The expansion of manufacturing activity was therefore a consistent cost to the country. It was 
a financial drain on the mining sector.  The foreign exchange earnings of the gold and other 
mineral resources exports funded raw material imports towards domestic industrial expansion. 
It can be argued that South African industrialisation up to the Second World War was ‘self-
defeating’ (Lumby, 1982a:218).The protected domestic market undermined international 
competitiveness, since the domestic market excluded foreign industrial competition through 
import duties and protective tariffs. The local manufacturing industry therefore expanded, but 
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was inefficient and relied on the use of a relatively large workforce, rather than optimal 
mechanisation. 
The real take-off of South Africa industrialisation occurred after the Second World War. As 
European economic recovery restored global demand on the back of the success of the Bretton 
Woods institutions, the South African manufacturing industry was at the crossroads. Unless 
diversification and improved efficiency was achieved, the drain on resources would stifle 
general economic growth. South Africa was in a favourable position after the war. The country 
could respond to international demand for growth opportunities, since domestic industries 
could respond to demand which the war-ravaged economies could not meet due to the complete 
destruction of manufacturing capabilities/infrastructure. Growth opportunities in the domestic 
market resulted in strong capital inflows into the domestic market, high demand oiled high 
inflation and relative political stability secured access to labour market. Sustained state 
protection for the domestic industrial sector ensured significant industrial expansion. Between 
1939 and 1976 the number of industrial establishments rose from 8 614 to 15 222. The total 
number of the workforce in manufacturing industries rose from 236 123 in 1939 to 1 349 485 
in 1976. The net value of output rose from R128 136 000 in 1939, to R7 836 374 000 in 1976.  
This expansion finally resulted in the structural change in the South African economy in 1965, 
when the industrial sector’s contribution to GDP exceeded that of the mining sector for the first 
time. (SA Statistics, 1939-1978).  
In the post-war period industrial diversification the massive expansion of operations of the iron 
and steel industry, with the central role performed by ISCOR, as well as the expansion and 
diversification of the chemical industry, contributed to the structural transformation. The 
establishment and expansion of SASOL was the main reason for the growth in the chemical 
industry (Verhoef, 2003; 2010). SASOL did not supply cheap fuel from coal to the local 
economy, but it established the core of research and development of world-leading chemical 
technology in South Africa, which ultimately stimulated local chemical industry diversification 
and global export of locally patented innovative CTL and later GTL technology. ISCOR 
provided subsidised steel for the construction of transport infrastructure, industrial 
infrastructure and engineering developments, which set the South African industrial 
development apart from any other industrial development in Africa.  
The strong industrial diversification and growth occurred at a time when Africa excelled in 
decolonisation and destruction. The Congo crisis of 1960, the South African decision to leave 
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the British Commonwealth in 1961 and to become a Republic, fuelled domestic opposition 
against the policies of racial segregation. Gradually political opposition surfaced and by the 
mid-1970s erupted in sustained political destabilisation. The political economy of South Africa 
mitigated against more comprehensive global market integration. As South Africa was 
increasingly marginalised on the grounds of its domestic policy of racial segregation, state 
policies turned increasingly inward. During the late 1970s insurance companies were required 
to incorporate in South Africa and then banks and other financial institutions were required to 
have a majority local shareholders. As international sanctions increasingly shut down the flow 
of foreign investment, the high cost of sustaining an economy in the wake of international 
adversity, capital outflows, mounting domestic inefficiencies and socio-political instability, 
economic growth grounded to a halt. Feinstein argued that South Africa experienced ‘a hundred 
years of economic growth, since the development of the mining industry and the slowdown of 
the 1970s. He is off course exaggerating the long trend of growth, but he actually points to the 
stagnation of the economy since the mid-1970s because of the socio-political impasse that 
finally mandated political changes to secure economic recovery. The political economy of 
South Africa since the late nineteenth century, both under agency of the British state and South 
African politicians from different ethnic orientations, succeeded in transforming a ‘relative 
backward country, almost wholly dependent on a largely self-sufficient agricultural sector,… 
into a dynamic, modern, capital-intensive economy’ (Feinstein, 2005:200). A dramatic 
structural break then set in during the mid-1970s. 
The industrial take-off in South Africa thus occurred along the List proposition of the 
protection of infant industries. This was explained in the discussion on the industrial promotion 
policies since the 1920s. This explanation aligns with Rostow’s view on the spreading of 
technology supporting industrial growth. The South African universities delivered research 
support through the training of mining engineers, chemists and metallurgical engineers who 
eventually worked in the iron and steel industries, the chemical industry (SASOL) and in the 
electricity and transport sectors. Many local engineers received doctoral qualifications abroad 
and assumed senior managerial positions in industry. South Africa indeed followed the 
Geschenkronian late-comer path by acquiring advanced technology from advanced economies, 
but also developed significant innovative technology securing it global leadership. The state 
off course subsidised the scientific development through the subsidisation of universities and 
the subsidisation of SASOL until the privatisation of the company.  
The data illustrates the growth and structural transformation of the South African economy.
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Table 1: National Income, per capita income and sectoral contribution, 1912-1985. 
Year National 
Income 
R’m 
Per Capita  
Income 
R 
Agriculture 
% 
Mining% Manufacturing 
% 
Commerce 
% 
1912 265.8 43.6 17.4 27.1 6.7 13.5 
1918 335.8 49.6 20.2 20.7 9.8 15.8 
1921 436.6 62.8 22.0 16.9 12.2 14.0 
1924 251.0 60.2 18.8 19.4 11.6 14.5 
1927 502.6 62.8 18.2 18.0 13.1 15.5 
1930 506.4 59.2 13.9 17.3 15.4 14.5 
1933 473.8 52.2 12.9 23.8 13.5 12.3 
1936 671.2 69.8 12.9 23.8 13.5 12.3 
1939 791.2 77.8 14.4 20.1 15.7 13.9 
1942 1 069.6 98.8 12.8 20.6 17.7 13.6 
1945 1 332.6 118.2 12.3 14.4 19.9 14.1 
1948 1 701.0 142.2 16.3 10.1 21.4 15.7 
1951 2 496.8 196.4 18.5 12.3 22.3 13.9 
1954 3 104.0 131.2 15.9 10.7 25.2 13.0 
1957 3 890.6 274.6 14.3 12.6 24.5 12.4 
1960 4 510.05  283.0 11.0 14.0 23.3 12.2 
1961 5 611 344.0 12.4 13.4 23.6 12.7 
1964 7 404 388 10.5 13.0 22.8 23.4* 
1967 9 511 459 11.7 11.7 23.4 23.0 
1970 12 518 557 8.3 10.3 24.2 26.2 
1973 19 921 819 8.2 12.0 21.9 26.4 
1976 31 037 1 191 7.8 11.9 24.0 26.9 
1979 49 153 1 979 6.7 17.9 22.2 23.9 
1982 82 490 3 390 6.4 13.9 24.4 25.6 
1985 125 919 3 728 5.8 15.4 22.8 25.7 
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, 1923-1986 
*From 1964 the % of commerce includes finance 
The structure of the economy displayed a growing contribution of the industrial sector. From 
the late 1930s the contribution of agriculture increased to the level of `927, but from 1957 the 
relative contribution of agriculture declined consistently to less than 6% by the mid-1980s. The 
contribution of mining to national income declined from just more than 23 % in the mid-1930s 
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to just over 15% by 1985. The significant structural shift occurred in the contribution of 
industry and commerce (which included the financial sector).  The contribution of the industrial 
sector to national income exceeded that of mining since 1945. From the mid-1960s industry 
contributed more than the combined contribution of agriculture and mining to the domestic 
economy. The significant growth in commerce and finance (the tertiary sector)  also surpassed 
the  contribution of the primary industries since mid-1960s. This shows successful 
industrialisation in the South African economy, albeit not integrating the entire economy. 
The policy of racial segregation sought to develop ethnically diversified state systems around 
separate economic centres. The only ‘state planning’ of industrial development was the official 
industrial decentralisation programme of the 1970s. The state offered fiscal incentives to 
industrialists to establish and develop industries on the decentralised locations of the 
homelands. This was an attempt to stimulate industrial development outside the existing 
industrial core and promote the development of the homelands. This policy had mixed 
outcomes. It was successful in establishing the automobile assembly industry in South Africa, 
as well as incentivising the automobile and related sub-components (parts) manufacturing 
industries. Full implementation implied heavy subsidisation by other sectors in the economy. 
It also coincided with mounting domestic political mobilisation against state policies and 
therefore grounded to a halt. The political failure of the policy had high costs for both the 
‘homelands’ and the South African economy. Industrial decentralisation succeeded in 
developing industrial activity on axes of the industrial core, but on the border of homelands. 
These efforts escalated the cost of industrial production and therefore market intervention and 
distortion. Failure of optimal efficiency of all factors of production, rendered the economy 
incapable of responding efficiently to international market volatility. By the 1970s global 
recession in the wake of the successive oil price hikes, subjected the South African economy 
to rising prices and contraction in demand from its major trading partners in Britain and Europe. 
Simultaneous domestic political mobilisation and international pressure, together with the 
inability of the domestic market to sustain itself in isolation while global deregulation opened 
international markets, resulted in the major economic downturn gaining momentum (Jones, 
2003).  
Between 1970 and 2000 macro-economic policy changed from non-market direct controls to 
deregulation and market-oriented policies. The fundamental transformation of a ‘siege 
economy’ under policies of racial segregation and separate development, was introduced. The 
new macro-economic framework under market-oriented policies had to support a single 
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democratic political economy, where monetary and fiscal policies were directed at addressing 
labour market reforms, because of the direct impact of these policies on employment. As South 
Africa dismantled racial segregation and followed international trends of deregulation and 
market-oriented macro-economic policies, the emerging changing institutional framework was 
a distinct result of global developments. When the country emerged from trade and cultural 
isolation, the new global context was advancing rapidly. Trade, technology and globalisation 
of exchange, distribution and production processes, placed the weakened South African 
economy at a distinct disadvantage. South African financial services were highly sophisticated, 
but as the country gradually joined the international community, it remained an emerging 
market. South Africa had to deal with a fundamentally changed international context. As 
signatory of the GATT Uruguay Agreement in 1993 (becoming effective in 1995), substantial 
revisions to the local industrial and commercial protectionist policies, left the industrial sector 
seriously exposed. An outward-oriented industrial policy opened the local market for 
competition, and as low productivity, production inefficiencies and declining growth prospects 
faced the economy, competition displaced underperforming industries. South Africa suffered 
the volatilities of all emerging markets, such as the 1998 Asian crisis. (Strydom, 2002: 31-50).  
Table 2: GDP growth, MVA and employment, 1915-2000. 
 GDP 
% 
MVA 
% 
Employment 
% 
1916/17-1926/27 4.00 6.80 1.82 
1926/27-1936/37 3.90 8.90 5.60 
1936/37-1946/47 3.70 6.10 6.38 
1946/47-1956/57 5.50 7.50 5.12 
 GDP 
% 
MVA 
% 
Employment 
% 
1946-1950 4.10 9.03 7.02 
1950-1955 4.89 7.48 5.39 
1955-1960 4.11 4.56 0.66 
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1960-1965 6.28 9.85 6.93 
1965-1970 5.15 7.38 2.84 
1970-1975 3.65 5.93 3.93 
1975-1980 3.09 4.47 1.90 
1980-1985 1.35 0.95 0.47 
1985-1990 1.67 1.59 1.09 
1990-1995 0.86 0.15 -1.25 
1995-2000 2.45 1.11 n/a 
 GDP 
% 
MVA 
% 
Employment 
% 
1950-1960 4.50 6.01 3.00 
1960-1970 5.71 8.61 4.87 
1970-1980 3.37 5.20 2.91 
1980-1990 1.51 1.27 0.78 
1990-1998 1.45 0.36 -1.40 
1990-2000 1.65 0.63 n/a 
 GDP 
% 
MVA 
% 
Employment 
% 
1970-1975 3.65 5.93 3.93 
1975-1978 1.71 2.05 0.85 
1978-1981 5.25 8.55 4.21 
1975-1981 3.47 5.25 2.52 
1970-1981 3.55 5.56 3.16 
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Source:  South African Statistics: 1915-2000. 
During the 1970s state expansionary macro-economic policies because of cost-push factors 
under growing international isolation, rushed inflation up well beyond the levels of inflation of 
South Africa’s trading partners. By January 1986 inflation was at 21% on the previous year, 
showing slow response to contracting monetary policies. The South African Reserve Bank 
introduced a policy of inflation targeting in 1999, and subsequently a target of between 3 and 
6 % inflation directed monetary policy, and no longer the M3. The most significant fact of 
South Africa as a Gerschenkronian ‘late industrialiser’, is that the country surpassed all other 
African countries in developing an advanced manufacturing base. South Africa also 
industrialised much earlier than the East Asian Tigers, but since 1980 industrial development 
slumped.   
The explanation of the successful industrialisation of South Africa lies firstly in the opportunity 
of the market. Industrial development was slow during the last half of the nineteenth century, 
since capital was primarily invested in the capital-hungry gold mining industry. Then towards 
the first decade of the twentieth century, capital investment came to an abrupt halt (Frankel, 
1967; Van Eck,1961). The relatively unexplored market for domestic industrialisation then 
presented a huge scope for import-substitution.  By the first decade of the twentieth century 
imports as a proportion of GDP, as well as manufacturing imports as a proportion of GDP both 
exceeded 50%. Thus ISI shifted development policies towards industrialisation.   As reflected 
in Table 2, manufacturing valued-added (MVA) rose to 9.03% in the first decade after the war 
and remained above 5% until the mid-1970s. By then South Africa had a relatively mature 
manufacturing sector, exporting a growing volume of local production. By 1916 industrial 
exports comprised only 8.2% of total exports, but rose to 26.3% of total exports by 1956 and 
31,4% of total exports by 1972. An abundance of natural resources and other factors of 
production, facilitated industrial development on the back of firm import-substitution policies.  
As reflected in Table 2, the decline in MVA started in the mid-1970s and continued into 
stagnation. During the 1970s massive hikes in the international gold price, earned South Africa 
huge windfalls in resource exports, thus depressing the ratio of manufacturing exports of total 
exports. The commodity price boom had a considerable impact on the allocation of investments 
into the different sectors of the economy. Higher resource prices contribute to the appreciation 
of the ZAR, high foreign exchange earnings and low interest rates. During the 1970s the 
investment in specifically the chemical sector (SASOL’s two new developments, Sasol ll and 
Sasol lll) contributed to  strong growth in industry. Domestic development of new technology 
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in the chemical industry was a strong injection to local industrial development. State local 
content policies assisted the development of the local motor vehicle industry, supported by 
ISCOR’s low-cost iron supplies. (Bell and Madula, 2002: 102-109). 
Domestic industrial stagnation followed the global slowdown in growth since the 1970s. The 
short-lived expectation  of the international commodity price boom that South African could 
make the shift from ISI to Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI),was halted, as the 
commodity price boom grounded to a halt during the later 1970s. Then followed overall OECD 
stagnation during the first half of the 1980s – and South Africa experienced the lag effect of 
those developments, as those trends in Britain and the OECD (Britain had just joined the EU) 
impacted adversely  on South African exports. An EOI strategy was severely contained by 
emerging market contraction and inability to compete internationally, as per capita income 
declined and growth slowed down. This was a trend Easterly noted across the developing 
world: the median per capita growth of developing countries  was 2.5% per annum between 
196-1979, but smashed to0.0% between 1980-19987. (Easterley, 2001: 3).  
How do we explain this stagnation? 
 In South Africa socio-political instability accounted for a significant contraction in output, 
both in the mining and manufacturing sector. International isolation contributed to foreign 
exchange inflow constraints. As market-oriented policies were introduced and trade 
liberalisation implemented, import substitution was virtually reversed.  Domestic industries 
could not compete with cheap imports from East Asia. A skills shortage undermined the 
transformation of the economy to compete with high-technology global industries. The strong 
growth was rather in the FIRE sectors: finance, insurance, real estate and business services 
sectors. The sophistication of the local financial services sector provided the platform for rapid 
global competitiveness and expansion. South Africa was better situated to advance in the ‘New 
Economy’, than in manufacturing. The South African slowdown occurred in the wake of the 
successful Japanese and German competition with USA manufacturing sectors since the 1960, 
as well as the industrial competition from South East Asia. South African preparation for the 
new information technology economy was marred by the political economy of black political 
transformation. The focus of power rather than human capital development undermined the 
sustainability of the advantage the country had during the 1960s. Ultimately, strained and tense 
state-business alliances shifted dynamically, but held a stable core during the take-off years of 
local industrial development. The sophistication of the economy, in all sectors, mining, 
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manufacturing, services (financial sector) in the age of globalisation and deregulation, coupled 
with the structural break caused by production inefficiencies and stagnation, forced the political 
system into fundamental realignment. 
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